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Chapter 5
Offshoring Trends
1 Introduction
Offshoring and outsourcing of manufacturing and knowledge work is a highly visible 
and controversial issue in the public debate over the impacts of globalization. In 
their efforts to expand markets and optimize production for competitive advantage, 
firms distribute their activities around the world through their own offshore subsidi-
aries, by outsourcing to other firms, or both. This pattern is blamed by many critics 
for job losses in the U.S., while credited by others with benefiting U.S. firms, share-
holders and consumers. In reality the impacts of offshoring and outsourcing are 
hard to measure as they can be subtle and indirect. For instance, there is no measure 
for jobs that were never created in the U.S. because new products were sourced 
from overseas from almost their inception.
However, by observing one industry over time, it is possible to identify patterns in 
the location of production work and knowledge work, and to qualitatively assess the 
impacts of offshoring on firms and workers. Production work is operations-oriented 
and includes activities such as subassembly, final assembly and logistics. Knowledge 
work is innovation-oriented and includes activities such as R&D, design and develop-
ment of new products and process engineering. We focus on the PC industry, which 
offers an important case for understanding the forces that influence U.S. firms to 
outsource their activities, and for identifying the impacts of those decisions.
Production work was the first to be offshored, but now knowledge work is also 
being pulled offshore to the locus of production. Although the PC industry was 
concentrated in the U.S. at the beginning,1 the industry quickly went global for 
production. The industry first went offshore to source low cost components from 
Asia and then moved manufacturing offshore to reduce distribution/logistics costs 
in overseas markets. As competition in the industry grew more intense, companies 
outsourced much of their subassembly to contract manufacturers and later also 
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 The top ten companies were U.S. firms who did most production themselves, with 50% in the 
U.S., and who had a 73% share of the global market in 1985 (Dedrick & Kraemer 1998).
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outsourced much final assembly. Between 1985 and 2005, over 125,000 computer 
hardware jobs were lost in the U.S., the same time that global computer production 
more than tripled. So not only have jobs been lost, but new jobs have been created 
elsewhere as the industry has grown. These jobs in manufacturing, engineering, 
management and customer service were created in places like Taiwan, Singapore, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Mexico, Scotland, France and Ireland, but now those 
places also are losing jobs as production shifts en masse to China.
Today, this pattern is being repeated in product design and development, especially 
for notebook computers which are much more design/development intensive than 
desktops. Notebook development shifted from the U.S. to Taiwan in the 1990s as U.S. 
firms outsourced development to Taiwanese original design manufacturers (ODMs). 
Again, more than losing jobs, the U.S. never saw those jobs created, as leading PC 
makers built their notebook businesses from the ground up using Taiwanese ODMs. As 
the notebook/laptop segment grew from a very small share of the market to reach over 
a quarter of all PCs sold in 2005, engineering jobs were created in Taiwan (and to some 
extent in Japan, where IBM designed most of its notebooks), rather than in the U.S. The 
knowledge jobs that do exist in the U.S. are mostly in market research, conceptual 
design, project management and marketing (Dedrick J. & Kraemer K.L. 2008).
Even some of those jobs are now being “pulled” offshore to be closer to the 
actual engineering development of new products (Dedrick J. & Kraemer K.L. 
2006). Branded PC firms such as Apple, Dell and Hewlett–Packard have set up 
design centers in Taiwan in order to better monitor ongoing contracts and upgrade 
the capabilities of their suppliers so more design activities can be shifted there 
(Digitimes 2007). Dell, which had previously done final assembly of notebooks 
with base units shipped to Malaysia from China, is reported to be considering hav-
ing the ODMs do full assembly and shipping direct.
At the same time, the Taiwanese manufacturers are moving more engineering 
activities to China to be close to their manufacturing plants. They also are expand-
ing their design and project management capabilities at home in order to take over 
more of the design process from the lead PC makers (Yang 2005).
The impact of globalization in the U.S. PC industry is one of continuing job 
losses, with ever fewer, although higher paying, knowledge jobs retained in the U.S. 
for new product development, sales and support for large customers, and headquar-
ters operations. On the other hand, U.S. PC companies remain world leaders in 
market share and U.S. consumers benefit from ever-cheaper hardware. Many U.S. 
jobs also have been created in complementary industries such as software, IT services 
and on the Internet, thanks in part to the availability of low cost PCs made offshore. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to try to measure all of the economic costs and 
benefits of offshoring and outsourcing. However, it is possible to distill some lessons 
from the PC industry by looking at the following issues:
• How have offshoring and outsourcing evolved for operations and innovation 
activities in the industry?
• What factors have influenced firm decisions?
• What has been the impact of offshoring and outsourcing on the competitiveness 
of U.S. companies and on U.S. jobs in the industry?
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2 Conceptual Framework
2.1 Firm Strategy and Competitive Advantage
Our conceptual approach, which is based in historical analysis similar to Brown and 
Linden (2005), relies on relating theories of firm strategy to the factors shaping 
sourcing decisions, and ultimately to the impact of those decisions on jobs and com-
petitiveness (Teece 1986; Porter 1990; Hagel & Singer 1999). Competitive advantage 
can be built through strategic focus on: (1) differentiation through innovation, and/
or (2) operational excellence through efficiency in production (Porter 1990).
These strategic foci are related to the principal reasons that PC firms keep cer-
tain activities in-house and outsource other activities. Innovation in the PC industry 
is focused mainly on new product development at the system level as component 
innovation is done upstream by suppliers of chips, software, storage, flat panels, 
batteries and power supply. It emphasizes developing slightly different products for 
narrowly defined market niches on short product cycles (Dedrick J. & Kraemer 
K.L. 2008). Innovation requires access to the lead market and capabilities in market 
analysis, concept design and product development.
In contrast, operational excellence focuses on production and is related to time 
and money – rapid product cycles, leveraged procurement, high quality manufac-
turing, lean supply chains (McMillan et al. 1999; Treacy & Wiersema 1995). As 
will be seen, the principal reasons for offshoring and outsourcing in the PC industry 
have been cost and access to specialized capabilities. While operations have been 
offshored for cost, innovation has been kept in-house for specialized capabilities 
which are now available offshore too.
2.2 Industry Dynamics
There is a dynamic to industry competition, which may ultimately change industry 
structure and jobs. When a branded PC company offshores an activity to reduce 
cost, it potentially improves its competitive position against rivals. In an expanding 
market, the firm will grow and hire more workers, some of whom will be in the 
home country and some offshore. If the branded firm is successful, rivals will imi-
tate its actions (Brown & Linden 2005).
Some of the workers in the home country may lose their jobs as the activity is shifted 
offshore; however the remaining home country workers may benefit if the company 
grows and is more profitable, and new jobs may be created in other areas (e.g., marketing 
instead of engineering). Likewise, consumers may benefit from lower prices on products 
outsourced offshore. The lower prices may expand the home market for the product as 
well as complementary products, thereby creating jobs in related industry segments 
(such as software, services, retail). It is difficult to estimate this job creation. In a growing 
industry, it is also difficult to estimate the number of jobs that would have been created 
in the U.S. if an activity had not been moved offshore (Brown & Linden 2005).
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Competitors and suppliers often follow successful firms in outsourcing offshore, and 
over time, firm investments in a foreign location may transform that location in a way 
that changes the industry’s structure. A foreign location that initially was little more than 
a source of low cost labor for production might develop into a specialized industry 
cluster that becomes a favored location for certain activities for the whole industry 
(Brown & Linden 2005). In the PC industry, production clusters have emerged in 
the Taipei/Hsinchu region of Taiwan, in Singapore, in Penang, Malaysia, and in the 
Shenzhen/Guangdong Province and Shanghai/Suzhou regions of China. These clusters 
developed extensive supply bases to support manufacturing of PCs, components and 
peripherals. Some have further developed their capabilities to attract activities farther up 
the value chain, such as product development and software development, resulting in 
more outsourcing by branded firms. The knowledge and experience gained in managing 
these outsourced activities offshore may encourage expanding to other activities such 
as R&D and design. Within the PC industry, the notebook segment illustrates this 
dynamic as design, development and manufacturing have become spread across 
geographic borders, development and manufacturing has been outsourced and the 
industry increasingly concentrated in the Shanghai/Suzhou area of China.
2.3 Methodology and Data
Within this framework, we describe the historical evolution of operations and innova-
tion activities in the PC industry – analyzing the factors that have shaped the sourcing 
of these activities over time, assessing the impacts on jobs and competitiveness and 
drawing industry lessons from the experience. Within operations we focus on manu-
facturing and within innovation we focus on product design and development (Fig. 1). 
We also distinguish between desktops and notebooks as their patterns differ.
The data for this analysis is from secondary sources (indicated in tables), news 
media, our own prior research and over 100 field interviews with PC makers, ODMs 
Fig. 1 The PC industry value chain. Adapted from Curry and Kenney, 1999
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and component suppliers in the U.S., Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Ireland, Taiwan 
and China over the period 1995–2005 (see Dedrick J. & Kraemer K.L. 2005 for list 
of firms interviewed).
3 The Evolution of Offshoring in the PC Industry
Historically, offshoring in the PC industry occurred in three major phases that map 
the changes in the industry’s key operations and innovation activities. Table 1 provides 
a detailed timeline and Appendix A summaries key aspects of the industry’s evolution 
for operations and innovation activities.
Table 1 Offshoring evolution in the PC industry
Year Operations (Manufacturing) Innovation (Design and development)
Phase 1
1980 –  U.S. assembly of desktops in-house, 
onshore
–  U.S. design, development in-house, 
onshore
–  Some components sourced offshore 
from Asia (motherboards, disk drives, 
cases, power supply)
1985–1989 –  In-house production offshored to 
major regions
–  U.S., Japan, Europe (very limited) 
design, development in-house, onshore
–  Notebook production begins in U.S., 
Europe, Asia
Phase 2
1990 –  Desktop base builds (subassemblies) 
outsourced to Asia
–  U.S., Europe, Asia design, development 
in-house, onshore
–  Desktop final assembly outsourced 
to contract manufacturers (CMs) in 
regions
–  Notebook production outsourced to 
Japan and Taiwan
–  Notebook design – U.S., Japan in-
house, onshore
1995 –  Complete desktop systems (low end) 
outsourced to Taiwan
– Development outsourced to Taiwan
–  Notebook production concentrated in 
Taiwan
–  Taiwan begins notebook development 
(low end), upgrades capabilities
Phase 3
2000 –  Desktop base builds concentrated in 
Shenzhen, China
–  Desktop systems shipped direct from 
China (low end)
–  Design, development outsourced to 
Taiwan (low end)
–  Notebook production moved from 
Taiwan to Shanghai, China; systems 
shipped direct from China
–  Notebook development outsourced to 
Taiwan
2003 –  Vendors establish design centers in 
Taiwan
–  ODMs establish R&D centers in 
Taiwan
2005 –  Vendors and ODMs do collaborative 
design
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The first phase is the offshoring of operations from the U.S. and Japan to multiple 
locations around the world beginning in the early eighties, but accelerating in the late 
eighties. It coincided with the disaggregation of the computer industry from large 
vertically integrated companies to a horizontally-segmented structure distributed 
around the world (Grove 1996; Dedrick J. & Kraemer K.L. 1998). Offshoring started 
with the sourcing of components from abroad, followed by offshore assembly by U.S. 
subsidiaries and outsourcing of complete systems to offshore CMs (Contract 
Manufacturers) and ODMs (Original Design Manufacturers). The second phase is the 
offshoring of innovation in the form of product design and development in the early 
1990s. PC makers first outsourced design of motherboards and other subassemblies, 
and eventually turned to ODMs to develop complete systems. Most of this activity 
was concentrated in Taiwan. The third phase in the offshoring of the PC industry is 
the reconcentration of operations and innovation in China beginning in 2000. This 
began with operations, and has progressed to the point where nearly all notebook PCs 
and a large share of desktop PCs are now manufactured in China. The next step is the 
relocation of innovation activities to China, starting with process engineering for 
manufacturing and, more recently, some product development activities as well. The 
next three sections describe this industry evolution in detail.
3.1 Phase 1: Offshoring of Operational Activities
While the PC industry emerged first in the U.S., with most production concentrated 
there, the industry began to deconcentrate globally early in its history.
3.1.1 Offshoring of Component Production
The first step in the global deconcentration of the industry was the offshore production 
of many components. Apple and others sourced components from Asian suppliers 
before 1980, but offshoring of component production expanded dramatically in the 
early 1980s when IBM sourced components for the original IBM PC from 
Taiwanese companies (Dedrick J. & Kraemer K.L. 1998). The developers of the 
IBM PC used outsourcing to bring the PC to market quickly, which required using 
outside capabilities rather than developing them internally.
There were many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Taiwan that had the 
needed capabilities and therefore the work could be divided among them to provide 
IBM with flexibility in responding to demand. Taiwan also had low labor costs and 
skilled workers experienced in electronics assembly (CRTs, cables, connectors) and 
metalworking (cases). Other components were sourced from Japan and Korea, 
especially high volume memory chips and displays.
At the same time, the hard disk drive (HDD) industry began moving production 
to Singapore, led by U.S. companies such as Seagate. Government tax incentives 
and a skilled, disciplined work force were major factors for the offshore movement 
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of the HDD industry to Singapore. By locating in Singapore, the HDD firms could 
source labor-intensive parts such as coils and head assemblies from countries with 
lower labor costs such as Malaysia and Thailand, and do only final assembly in 
Singapore where labor costs were higher. Like the HDD industry, the semiconductor 
industry also moved final assembly offshore in the 1980s, also to locations in 
Southeast Asia such as Penang, Malaysia.
This offshore sourcing of labor intensive components supported final assembly 
jobs in the U.S. There were few job losses in the U.S. from offshore sourcing of 
components because most of these manufacturing jobs were created offshore; for 
instance, Seagate moved HDD production to Singapore only a year after the company 
was founded (Dedrick J. & Kraemer K.L. 1998). The effect was more a matter of 
jobs not created in the U.S. rather than a loss of existing jobs. In addition, the rapid 
growth of the industry enabled by offshore sourcing created many new U.S. jobs in 
the broader PC industry, including final assembly, distribution (logistics, wholesale, 
retail) and support (education, training , maintenance). However, this offshore 
sourcing had a huge impact on future job creation by developing the capabilities of 
Asian firms that would be eager to move down the supply chain to capture more 
value added and profits. The most dramatic example is Foxconn (the trade name of 
Hon Hai Precision Industry), which began as a manufacturer of cables and connectors, 
and is now the world’s largest contract electronics manufacturer with over 200,000 
employees and a major producer of PC components and subassemblies as well as 
PCs, iPods, video games and other final products.
The competitive impact of this initial offshoring was to create a low cost supply 
base that anyone could use, and more than 200 branded PC makers entered the 
industry (Langlois 1992). By 1985, IBM was the number one PC maker with 25% 
of the market, followed by Commodore and Apple with 14% each (Table 2). 
However, as IBM lost control of the key technology standards to Microsoft and 
Table 2 Rank and percent share of world shipments by top 10 PC makers
1985 Rank
1985 1995 2005
Firm % share Firm % share Firm % share
1 IBM 25 Compaq 10 Dell 18
2 Commodore 14 IBM 8 HP/Compaq 16
3 Apple 14 Apple 8 IBM 6
4 Tandy 8 Packard Bell 7 Acer 4
5 Compaq 3 NEC 4 Fujitsu/Siemens 4
6 Atari 3 HP 4 Toshiba 3
7 HP 2 Dell 3 NEC 3
8 ZDS 2 Acer 3 Lenovo 2
9 DEC 1 Fujitsu/ICL 3 Gateway 2
10 NCR 1 Toshiba 3 Apple 2
Top 10 share 73 53 60
U.S. share of 
Top 10
100 75 78
Source: International Data Corporation: table provided to authors and press releases
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Intel, its competitors were able to use the supply base that it created to attack IBM’s 
market share with low cost systems. At the national level, building a supply base in 
Asia helped U.S. companies to compete with Japanese PC makers who many feared 
would dominate the PC industry as they had in consumer electronics (Borrus 1997; 
Dedrick J. & Kraemer K.L. 1998).
3.1.2 Offshoring and Outsourcing of Subassembly and Final Assembly
Beginning in the late 1980s, leading PC makers such as IBM, Compaq, Apple and 
Dell set up subassembly and final assembly operations for desktops and notebooks 
offshore. PC makers did assembly in each major world region using their own sub-
sidiaries (including Ireland, Scotland, and France for Europe; Malaysia and 
Singapore for Asia Pacific; Mexico for the Americas).
Subassemblies such as motherboards and base units were sourced from Asian 
suppliers or U.S. contract manufacturers who located some production near the 
major vendors. The motivations for offshore desktop assembly were to reduce 
logistics cost by producing close to the market, to better understand country 
requirements, and to utilize local capabilities (suppliers, human resources, lan-
guage ). In addition, PC makers were attracted to Ireland, Malaysia and Singapore 
by generous tax incentives and a low cost, educated workforce.
3.1.3 Desktops versus Laptops
The form factor of desktops versus laptops has implications for their sourcing. For 
desktops, their bulk, weight and lower average selling price (ASP) results in con-
centrated assembly of “base units” in the lowest cost location with shipment by sea 
to final assembly plants located regionally. Base units include the metal case, moth-
erboard, fan, power supply, and cables and connectors. High value parts such as 
microprocessor, memory, hard drive, and optical drives are added at final assembly 
to minimize depreciation. The smaller, lighter form factor, tightly integrated physi-
cal design, and higher ASP of laptops leads to full assembly in one location and air 
shipment to distribution centers and customers.
By 2000, desktop assembly moved in two additional directions. Most PC makers 
(except Dell) outsourced standard build-to-forecast production completely to CMs 
or ODMs, who produce in low-cost locations (e.g., Eastern Europe, Mexico, China) 
for each major region (Europe, Africa and the Middle East; Americas; and Asia–
Pacific, respectively). Most build-to-order production was still done by the PC 
makers themselves in countries with more sophisticated logistics and skilled work-
ers (e.g., Ireland, Scotland, U.S., Malaysia), with base units and components 
shipped in from Asia. Since 2003, even this pattern has changed, as IBM, HP and 
Apple all outsourced build-to-order production by selling existing plants to CMs 
such as Sanmina-SCI who specialize in desktop production.
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U.S. PC makers began moving notebook production offshore in the early 1990s. 
Some turned to Japanese or Korean partners who had developed engineering 
and fabrication capabilities for small form factors through their consumer electron-
ics businesses. Taiwan developed a homegrown industry focused on notebook PC 
production, led by a set of ODMs such as Quanta and Compal, who developed 
specialized technical knowledge in issues critical to notebook performance such as 
battery life, heat dispersion, rugged mechanicals and electromagnetic interference. 
The Taiwanese ODMs soon surpassed Korean competitors who specialized in high 
volume production but lacked flexiblity and system integration skills developed by 
the Taiwanese. And while one original Apple Powerbook model was manufactured 
by Sony, Japanese firms generally concentrated on making their own brand name 
notebooks rather than being contract manufacturers or ODMs.
As vendor pricing pressure increased on the ODMs, the Taiwan government 
removed restrictions on manufacturing notebooks in China, and the Taiwanese 
notebook industry moved en masse to the Shanghai/Suzhou area of eastern 
China.2 In turn, the PC vendors began sourcing more full systems directly from 
the ODMs. By 2005, 73% of the world’s notebook computers were produced by 
Taiwanese firms (Table 3), and U.S. PC companies sourced from 40 to 100% of 
all notebooks from Taiwanese companies (Table 4). In 2007, virtually all note-
book production by Taiwanese ODMs is in China. Japanese firms, such as NEC, 
Toshiba, Sony and Fujitsu, who long touted their manufacturing skills as critical to 
competitive advantage are increasingly outsourcing notebook production to the 
Taiwanese firms (Table 4).
2
 It is significant that knowledgeable experts say that the decision to relocate notebook/laptop 
production to China was jointly undertaken by Taiwan ODM firms and their brand name partners 
from the U.S., Japan and Europe. Cited by Merritt T. Cooke (2004) and discussed in an article by 
Ho and Leng (2004).
Table 3 Taiwanese notebook industry share of global shipments, 1998–2005 (shipments by 
Taiwan-based firms, including offshore production)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (f)
Shipments 
volumea
6,088 9,703 12,708 14,161 18,380 25,238 33,340 39,035
Shipments 
valueb ($)
8,423 11,073 13,549 12,239 13,847 16,809 21,830 25,177
Average sales 
prices ($)
1,384 1,141 1,066 864 753 666 655 645
Global market 
by volumea
15,610 19,816 24,437 25,747 30,033 37,857 46,110 53,473
Taiwan’s share of 
global market 
volume (%)
40 49 52 55 61 66 72 73
Source: MIC (2005); 
aUnits in thousands; 
bU.S. dollars (millions)
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Table 4 PC makers outsourcing production to Taiwan firms
Flagship 
companies
Subsidi-aries 
in China
Outsourcing, 
2003a (%)
Outsourcing, 
2005b (%)
Taiwan ship-
ments, 2005c (%)
Taiwanese 
ODM suppliersa
Apple 100 100 5.1 Quanta, Asus, 
Elite
Delld Xiamen 90 90 21.6 Quanta, Compal, 
Wistron
HP Shanghai 90 100 19.1 Quanta, Compal, 
Wistron, 
Inventec, 
Arima
IBMe Shenzhen 40 40 4.2 Wistron, 
Quanta
Acer 100 100 Quanta, Compal, 
Wistron
NEC Shanghai 80 100 5.3 Arima, FIC, 
Wistron, 
Mitac
Sharp 50 n.a. n.a. Quanta, Mitac, 
Twinhead
Sony Wuxi 20 60 4.0 Quanta, Asus, 
Foxconn
Toshiba Hangzhou 15 70 9.6 Quanta, Compal, 
Inventec
Fujitsu-
Siemens
15 50 4.0 Wistron, Mitac, 
Uniwill, 
Quanta, 
Compal
a Ministry of Economic Affairs (2004); 
b Digitimes (2005a); 
c Digitimes (2005b); 
d Dell’s outsourcing figure refers to production of base units. Most of Dell’s final configuration is 
done in its own plants in Penang, Malaysia and Xiamen, China; 
e IBM’s PC business is now part of Lenovo, but this information is for IBM prior to its acquisi-
tion. Although IBM had its own notebook factory in Shenzhen, it sourced from Taiwanese firms 
for lower end products. The number estimated for IBM in the MOEA report for 2003 was 100%; 
we instead use an estimate of 40% from DigiTimes (2005a), which is consistent with information 
provided by IBM
3.2  Phase 2: Offshoring and Outsourcing 
of Innovation – Design and Development
As operations moved offshore, they eventually pulled other activities offshore as well, 
including new product design and development. Product design involves understanding 
customer wants and needs, tracking technology trends and translating technological 
capabilities into products that meet customer needs at the right price. This requires a 
combination of market intelligence, product planning, financial analysis, high-level tech-
nical analysis, and the ability to communicate with both customers and suppliers. 
Product development is where the actual mechanical, electrical and some software 
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development are done, with prototypes developed and tested. This requires electrical 
and mechanical engineering skills and experience with small form factor products 
(for notebook PCs). It also requires expensive physical test facilities.
The branded U.S. PC makers did notebook design/development in-house and 
onshore in the early years, but fell behind Japanese competitors who had superior 
skills in miniaturizing components and developing small, light, thin products. For 
instance, IBM did notebook design/development in the U.S. in the 1980s, but its PC 
Convertible was a failure and was withdrawn from the market in 1989 (Business 
Week 1991). IBM reacted by moving notebook design to its IBM Japan subsidiary, 
which came up with the award-winning Thinkpad design. Compaq worked with 
Japan’s Citizen Watch Co. to engineer its notebooks and produce key subassem-
blies. Apple contracted with Sony for one of the original Powerbook models.
In time, however, most PC makers turned to Taiwanese ODMs for manufactur-
ing, partly to lower costs and also to avoid dependence on Japanese partners who 
were competitors. The Taiwanese ODMs developed specialized engineering skills 
and began to take over product development for companies such as Compaq and 
Packard Bell. Other companies such as Dell and Gateway were able to enter the 
notebook market by working with the ODMs on design and development, taking 
advantage of the capabilities nurtured by their competitors. Currently, the major PC 
makers keep concept design and product management in-house, while outsourcing 
product development and process engineering to the ODMs.
A major factor influencing the move to outsourcing development was a “pull” 
from the ODMs. Taiwanese ODMs often did not charge explicitly for development, 
but did it in order to win production contracts (interviews in Taiwan and China). In 
addition, once the ODM had a contract, the relationship created incentives for both 
sides to continue outsourcing for future upgrades and enhancements to the product. 
There was a great deal of tacit knowledge created in the development process that 
was known only by the ODM. In addition, the close linkage of development activi-
ties to manufacturing and the feedback to design from manufacturing and sustain-
ing support, created linkages favoring continuing the ODM relationship in order to 
reduce costs and improve quality (Dedrick J. & Kraemer K.L. 2006).
Some PC makers (Dell and HP) have set up their own design centers in Taiwan 
in recent years, thus offshoring design while keeping it in-house. The motivations 
were multiple: lower cost engineers and programmers, faster development by hav-
ing test facilities nearby, availability of experienced engineers, host government tax 
incentives and closeness to emerging markets in Asia. However, the primary moti-
vation was proximity. By being close to the ODMs, the design center can send 
personnel to the ODM for problem solving and use the ODM’s testing facilities. If 
the design team were in the U.S., they would have to duplicate the problem in their 
own testing facility and try to solve it, which takes time and unnecessarily dupli-
cates testing facilities (PC company design center interview). In addition, by being 
close to the ODMs, the offshore design center can work on multiple products and 
with multiple ODMs. Coordination with headquarters marketing people and aligning 
with other product lines is handled by having a few design center staff located there 
and establishing common standards and software platforms.
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It is significant that the design centers have been located in Taiwan. A design 
center in Taiwan supports design activities for all the ODMs who might be suppliers 
to a PC maker. Taiwan has a skilled, experienced pool of moderate cost engineers 
and software professionals and the Taiwan government provided financial incen-
tives to attract the vendors. It also provided incentives to the Taiwanese ODMs to 
establish R&D centers in Taiwan to reinforce the linkage.
It is difficult to estimate the impact of this outsourcing on jobs in the U.S., but 
it is clear that there have been job losses. Dell and HP each employ 300–500 engi-
neers in their Taiwan design centers. More importantly, there has not been new job 
creation in the U.S. for a growing product line, as there has been a permanent shift 
of knowledge and skills in notebook development from the U.S. to Taiwan. Dell is 
now planning to reduce design engineers in the U.S. and Taiwan, relying more on 
the ODMs for notebook design (Digitimes 2007). In addition, the same ODMs that 
develop most notebooks have moved into other products such as cell phones, where 
they are applying their engineering talent to develop new products sold under their 
own brand names and on an ODM basis to cell phone providers such as Motorola, 
Siemens, Nokia, Sony Ericsson and Panasonic (Pick 2005).
3.3  Phase 3: Concentration of Operations 
and Innovation in China
The final stage in the evolution of offshoring appears to be bringing the industry 
full circle. The U.S. PC industry began with most activities concentrated in the 
U.S., with some component production in Asia. It then disintegrated, offshored and 
outsourced activities to various countries. It is now reconcentrating – not in the 
U.S., but in China. Production and logistics are already operating there, and devel-
opment is starting to be moved (You-Ren & Hsia 2004). Just as manufacturing has 
pulled development to China for better time-to-market, flexibility and efficiency, so 
might development eventually pull design activities, especially as the China market 
becomes a key market for PCs.
For desktops, the reconcentration is occurring in the Shenzhen area of South China, 
where nearly all desktop “base builds” are manufactured as well as complete systems 
for the Asia–Pacific and U.S. markets (at least in build-to-forecast production). For 
notebooks, the reconcentration is occurring in notebooks as Taiwanese ODMs move 
development to the Shanghai/Suzhou area. The Taiwanese motivation is described as 
cost-effective human capital augmentation (Lu & Liu 2004). Accessing capable yet 
cost effective engineers with the additional benefit of geographical and linguistic 
proximity is the major motive. Also, Taiwan’s supply of engineers does not meet 
demand, whereas China has a large pool of well-educated local engineers who are about 
half the cost of their Taiwanese counterparts. China and Taiwan share a common 
culture and language which facilitates communication. Shanghai/Suzhou and Taiwan 
are not far apart, which makes managers willing to relocate for several years and also 
makes it possible for executives in Taipei to supervise operations first hand.
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The ODMs’ Taiwan design units are responsible for the development of 
advanced technologies and new products that provide competitive advantage for the 
parent company. As these products are moved into production in China, develop-
ment of product variations, incremental improvement and life cycle support has 
followed. The two major PC makers who continue to manufacture significant 
amounts of notebooks in-house, Lenovo (including the former IBM PC division) 
and Toshiba, have concentrated production in China, and also have moved some 
product development there. By locating development close to production, the 
manufacturing sites get immediate technical support for the rapid product cycles of 
notebooks while the designers get immediate feedback from manufacturing and 
support that enables them to make improvements.
4 Factors Influencing Outsourcing and Offshoring
4.1 Costs
As the foregoing discussion has indicated, offshoring has been shaped primarily by cost 
and capabilities. Cost has been the major factor pushing production activities offshore 
in the first instance, while the upgrading of capabilities by offshore firms has been a 
major factor pulling knowledge activities offshore. Cost pressure is particularly acute 
in the PC industry because Intel and Microsoft reportedly capture 90% of the industry’s 
profits.3 Cost has been reduced by locating in lower cost areas, leveraging location 
for financial incentives from host countries, and outsourcing to CMs and ODMs.
Because the early PCs (desktops and portables) were heavy and bulky, and had 
to meet different country requirements, production had to be decentralized to major 
regions rather than concentrated. Most vendors did only final assembly themselves 
relying on regionally-based CMs and ODMs for base units and suppliers for 
components. As the industry grew, new entrants located near the first movers in 
order to achieve agglomeration economies by using their supply base. As competition 
in the industry increased, vendors sought still lower costs by outsourcing more 
production to the CMs who could achieve cost savings by large-scale purchasing 
and assembly for multiple vendors.
3
 In the debate over HP’s acquisition of Compaq, data presented by Walter Hewlett showed 
Microsoft and Intel capturing 90% of the industry’s profits in 2002. Dell’s efficient model enabled 
it to lower prices, which other vendors have had to match by greater use of outsourcing and continu-
ous pressure on ODMs and suppliers to cut costs. Vendors force the ODMs to compete with one 
another for business and expect continuous quarterly cost reductions of 5–7% (field interviews with 
ODMs and suppliers). Suppliers have gone along with these practices in the hopes that lower prices 
would grow the market and enable them to achieve economies of scale. Low profits on the order of 
1–2% have led some ODMs to vertically integrate and to develop their own brand products, while 
others have moved upstream to produce subassemblies and components. The result for the PC 
industry has been a continual increase in the volume of units sold, but only a modest increase in the 
dollar volume of sales, and a continual decline in profits for both PC makers and suppliers.
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The PC vendors leveraged their location decisions with government incentives. 
Tax holidays, land, facilities and work force training attracted vendors to locate in 
places like Ireland and Scotland in Europe, Tennessee and North Carolina in the 
U.S., and Singapore and Malaysia in Asia. Usually, the vendors encouraged/
required their suppliers and contract manufacturers to locate production or at least 
supply hubs nearby, which further increased their leverage. As the costs of these 
places rose over time, the supply bases were moved to lower cost places in Eastern 
Europe and China. If the government incentives continued, some or all final assem-
bly might be kept in the original location (e.g., Dell in Ireland, Malaysia), or other 
activities such as regional headquarters, IT services or call centers moved to the 
old plant location (e.g., Apple in Ireland). Later, even some of these activities were 
turned over to outsourcers in order to further reduce costs.
4.2 Capabilities
The global production capabilities of large CMs such as Solectron, SCI and 
Flextronics were also a factor in the move to outsourcing by PC vendors, especially 
for desktops. The CMs had a global footprint, which enabled them to serve customers 
anywhere in the world. They built large industrial parks capable of incorporating 
suppliers, supply hubs and logistics firms for agglomeration economies. Their facto-
ries also could run one or many production lines, offering flexibility in responding 
to the volatile PC demand. As cost pressures increased, the branded vendors 
decided to also outsource additional activities such as final assembly,4 logistics and 
warranty repair to 3–4 global CMs and logistics partners.
For notebook PCs, firm capabilities were also important but the pattern was different 
as both development and production were outsourced and these capabilities were 
concentrated in a few ODMs in Taiwan. They had developed skills in small form 
factor products through work in consumer electronics that they could apply to note-
books. Their lower costs and government assistance enabled the ODMs to invest in new 
skills (industrial design, engineering design, system integration) and technological 
upgrading (R&D, prototyping and testing facilities), which they then used to “pull” 
development activities from the PC vendors. In some cases, the branded PC makers 
pushed the ODMs to develop greater design skills and even assisted them (Firm 
interviews). In contrast to desktop computers, where design and development was 
decentralized due to the high modularity and large form factor, design in notebooks 
was concentrated because the high level of integration in such a small form factor 
required design and production engineering to be close to one another and the form 
factor enabled cost-effective shipment by air to end customers from a centralized 
production site (Dedrick J. & Kraemer K.L. 2008).
4
 Dell outsourced base unit production, but not final assembly because its business strategy and 
marketing emphasized build-to-order and configure to order production as a differentiator, especially 
for commercial customers.
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5 Impacts of Offshore Sourcing
5.1 Geographical Shift of Activities
The most consequential change from offshore sourcing is the geographical shift 
of production and development activities from the Americas and Europe to the 
Asia–Pacific. In 1985, the Americas led in production with a 53% share, with 
the remainder nearly equally divided between Europe and the Asia–Pacific. By 1990, 
the Asia–Pacific region surpassed the Americas as the largest producer of computer 
hardware, even though the largest market was in the Americas and most leading PC 
vendors were U.S. companies (Table 5). The Asia–Pacific region has continuously 
gained production at the expense of both the Americas and Europe/Middle East/
Africa (EMEA) to the present. The share of production in the Americas was stable 
from 1990 to 2001 at 31–32%, but has since fallen to 24% (Table 5).
At the country level, the U.S. was the leading computer hardware producer until 
2004 when China took over the leading spot with 24.3% of world shipments com-
pared to 17.9% for the U.S. It is likely that the U.S. share will continue to decline 
as more production is shifted to China. Within the Asia–Pacific region, Japan was 
the leading producer as late as 2000, with significant production also moving to 
Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. Since 2000, China’s production has 
tripled, while Taiwan’s production has declined by two–thirds and Japan’s has 
fallen by nearly half (Table 6). This is not a coincidence as most Taiwanese computer 
manufacturing moved to China, while major Japanese companies have established 
factories in China as well.
Table 5 Percent share of global computer hardware production by region, 1985–2005
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Americas 53 32 32 31 22
EMEA 24 27 20 17 15
Asia–Pacific 23 41 48 52 63
Source: Reed Electronics Research, Yearbook of World Electronics Data, 2006
Table 6 Leading computer producing countries, 1990–2005 (% share global production)
Country 1990 1995 2000 2005 2005 Rank
China 0.4 1.9 7.3 32.4 1
U.S. 27.0 26.5 24.0 17.3 2
Japan 29.2 25.2 17.3 8.7 3
Korea 1.7 2.4 4.0 5.6 4
Singapore 3.9 7.3 5.9 5.4 5
Malaysia 0.2 1.8 4.6 3.0 6
Thailand 0.9 1.9 2.2 2.3 11
Taiwan 3.3 5. 7.2 1.5 13
Source: Reed Electronics Research, Yearbook of World Electronics Data, 2005
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5.2 Competitiveness of U.S. Firms
U.S. PC companies, particularly Dell and HP with 34% of the market, lead the PC 
industry in terms of worldwide shipments, and Apple has rebounded since 2005, 
but other U.S. PC makers are losing money and over the years many have 
disappeared from the market altogether (Commodore, Tandy, Compaq, Atari, ZDS, 
AST, DEC, Packard Bell, IBM PC Company) by 2005 (Table 2). Whereas U.S. 
companies constituted all of the Top 10 in 1985, did most production in-house 
onshore, and had a 73% share of the market, there were only four U.S. companies 
in the Top 10 in 2005, most production was outsourced offshore, and they had a 
44% share. The competitive fate of many firms in the U.S. PC industry is 
symbolized by the IBM PC Company, which owned 25% of the market in 1985 and 
was bought by China’s Lenovo in 2005. Still, U.S. firms accounted for a larger 
share of sales among the top ten countries in 2005 than in earlier years.
In terms of competition in the notebook industry, Taiwanese ODMs largely level 
the playing field in development and manufacturing, greatly reducing the advan-
tages held by firms such as Lenovo/IBM and Toshiba who have strong internal 
development and manufacturing capabilities. The ODMs upgrading of capabilities 
have helped to shift the competitive focus of PC makers away from development to 
concept design, marketing, branding, distribution and customer service. This plays 
to the strengths of U.S. companies, and HP and Dell have become the two leading 
notebook vendors worldwide. The leadership of U.S. companies is even more pro-
nounced in the desktop market, where products are more commoditized and the 
importance of marketing and service is greater.
5.3 Jobs and Employment5
The heavy reliance of U.S. computer makers on offshore production and outsourcing 
clearly entails a loss of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. For example, the U.S. lost 
nearly 100,000 jobs in computer hardware between 1998 and 2003, of which 
40,000 were production jobs (Table 7).
In PCs, the assembly jobs that remain in the U.S. tend to be in more skill-inten-
sive operations such as configure-to-order assembly. There also is production for 
corporate customers who require rapid order fulfillment and those that require the 
PCs to be made in the U.S. for security reasons (such as military, government and 
their contractors).
5
 Comprehensive data on PC production is not available by geography, so we use total computer 
hardware, for which country data is available. PCs and related peripherals now account for about 
65% of total hardware sales. Secondary literature review shows that production of larger systems is 
distributed among the three regions, but with less dispersion beyond traditional locations—mainly 
the U.S., Japan, France, Germany and the U.K.
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The U.S. has more nonproduction jobs in computer hardware, such as design, 
marketing, customer service, finance and various headquarters functions. These are 
better matched to the wage and skill levels of most of the U.S. work force than low-
skilled assembly jobs. However, nearly 60,000 of those jobs disappeared from 1998 
to 2003 (calculated from Table 7).
It is not possible to measure how many jobs were moved offshore and how many 
disappeared through automation or for other reasons, but it is clear that the rapid 
growth of the worldwide PC market, led by U.S. PC makers, was accompanied by 
a substantial loss of computer hardware jobs in the U.S. The decline of U.S. pro-
duction from 26.5% of world production in 1995 to 17.3% in 2005 (Table 6) sug-
gests that some of the job loss shown in Table 7 was due to offshoring.
More broadly, offshoring (and increased productivity) in hardware production 
appears to have been beneficial for the U.S. in the short run—though clearly some 
sectors, firms and workers lost out. It was likely a factor behind the surge of 
employment in software and services from 1985 to 2000 (Table 8).
The availability of low cost hardware meant that firms and consumers could 
afford more computers, creating demand for additional packaged software and 
Table 7 U.S. and offshore employment in computer hardware
1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Hardware 
employment 
in U.S.
322,100 301,900 286,200 250,000 224,000 210,000 205,100 198,800
Production 
workers
126,100 116,000 103,800 97,700 86,000 87,300 116,900 131,000
Employed by 
foreign firms
35,600 26,600 24,600 29,800 24,800
Offshore 
employment by 
U.S. MNC’s
216,900 205,100 221,700 211,300
Sources: Dedrick and Kraemer 1998 (for 1985 hardware employment); Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2003, Current Employment Statistics Public Data Query (for Hardware employment and Production 
workers in the U.S. 1990–2003); Mataloni 2000–2005 (for Offshore employment by U.S. MNCs); 
Mataloni and Fahim-Nader 1996; Zeile 2000–2005 (Hardware employment by foreign firms)
Note: Numbers in italics are after the classification system switch from SIC’s Computers and Office 
Machinery to NAICS/s Computers and Peripheral Equipment
Table 8 U.S. employment in IT services and software
1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006
Information 
services
600,000 650,900 892,100 1,616,200 1,466,400 1,508,400 1,591,200
Packaged 
software
Included 
above
141,500 210,500 324,000 282,200 282,400 284,500
Sources: Dedrick and Kraemer 1998 (for 1985 data); Bureau of Labor Statistics 2003 (for all 
other years) Website: http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/outside.jsp?survey = ce.
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information services in the U.S. and around the world. Given that U.S. companies 
dominated these sectors, their growth led to job creation in the U.S., but now design, 
software and services jobs are also now going offshore (and in some cases becoming 
more automated). Since 2000, the U.S. has lost about 220,000 jobs in IT services 
and another 40,000 in packaged software (Table 8). With the shift of software and 
services to India and other locations, it is unlikely that these jobs will be recaptured.
6 Conclusion
6.1 Lessons from the PC Industry
Several important lessons can be gleaned from the experience of offshoring in the PC 
industry. These are generally consistent with findings from the semiconductor industry 
(Brown & Linden 2005), which suggests that they may be applicable to high-tech 
industries more generally. The first lesson is that offshoring was instrumental in the 
birth and growth of the PC industry, providing affordable products through sourcing 
components offshore in Asia. The extension of offshore production through subsidiar-
ies outsourcing to foreign suppliers fueled market growth by reducing production and 
logistics costs. During the 1980s, there was great concern that Japan would dominate 
the computer industry as it had earlier with consumer electronics, but it did not hap-
pen. Japanese PCs sold well in Japan but were a failure outside because proprietary 
features made them expensive and incompatible. European champions (ICL, Siemens, 
Olivetti) also could not compete outside their home markets. U.S. firms’ overseas 
operations helped them to better target global markets, grow the industry, achieve 
economies of scale and produce profits for reinvestment. For the U.S., offshoring 
appears to have been an important competitive tool.
The second lesson is that offshoring leads to the redistribution of activities 
across both organizational and geographical boundaries, thereby changing industry 
structure. This is most apparent in notebooks where Taiwanese ODMs have taken 
over product development, manufacturing, and some customer service functions 
(such as warranty repair), with development in Taiwan and China, assembly in 
China and services provided in regional markets. Branded PC makers control 
design, marketing and customer services (sales, technical support). Design is 
located in the U.S. and in design centers set up in Taiwan close to the ODMs, 
marketing is mostly in the U.S. and other key markets.
A third lesson is that offshoring can lead to a “sequential hollowing out” of 
activities from one location to another. Notebook PCs were originally assembled in 
the U.S., but full assembly migrated to Taiwan and now is in China. The practice 
of “Taiwan Direct Ship” and now “China Direct Ship” means that logistics is 
migrating as well, as notebook factories in China ship direct to customers by air. 
The bulk and weight of desktops means that build-to-order production is done close 
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to the final market, but base units are being sent by sea from China to regional 
assembly sites with more and more components preinstalled so that only very 
expensive or custom components are added during final assembly in the local market. 
Also, build-to-forecast PCs are being built in China and shipped to distributors in 
the final market.
A fourth lesson is that the loss of manufacturing does not necessarily mean hol-
lowing out of all activity in a particular location. Apple Computer has been in 
Cork, Ireland for over 20 years, with employment fluctuating between 1,000 and 
1,500, but the composition of that work force has changed dramatically since 2000. 
Apple has outsourced nearly all European production, but its European operations 
(headquarters, design center, call centers, IT, software localization and some custom 
assembly) have been consolidated in Cork. Thus, jobs have been lost in several 
European locations while there has been consolidation of other activities in Cork 
(Gantly 2003). Likewise, while Quanta has moved all of its notebook production to 
China, it has built a new R&D center at its Taiwan headquarters, where it expects 
to employ up to 7,000 scientists and engineers (Quanta interviews). Other ODMs 
are doing the same.
A fifth lesson is that offshoring can lead to the development of capabilities that 
“pull” higher level activities to the offshore location. The sourcing of PC compo-
nents from Asia led to the upgrading of capabilities by local companies; this in turn 
led to the sourcing of subassemblies and full systems by the PC makers. Local firms 
in Taiwan became proficient in product development and used those services as a 
competitive factor for winning production business. Product development in 
Taiwan is now pulling multinational corporation (MNC) design centers to Taipei, 
just as manufacturing in China is pulling some development activities from Taiwan 
to China. Proximity, which enables faster problem resolution and better communi-
cation, is a key “pull” factor, reinforced by the availability of lower cost and 
specialized engineering talent.
A final lesson is that it is unclear whether offshore outsourcing is directly creat-
ing new global competitors in the PC industry. For 15 years, most CMs and ODMs 
have not sought to develop their own brands for global markets. This has been due 
to lack of marketing and distribution capabilities and fear of losing business from 
the flagship customers if they are seen as trying to compete with them. Acer, which 
was both a branded PC company and an ODM, created an independent subsidiary 
(Wistron) for its ODM business. As the notebook makers have moved to China, 
they also have not established branded businesses for the China market. Instead, 
they are suppliers to the Chinese PC makers just as they are to the foreign MNCs. 
So far there has not been any sign of spin-offs by Chinese entrepreneurs who have 
worked for U.S. or Taiwanese firms in China.
However, there are signs that some Taiwanese ODMs might become direct com-
petitors in the future. Acer, which separated its ODM business from its own brand 
business, is now ranked the fourth largest PC maker in the world, and is the leader 
in Europe. Asustek and Arima are following Acer’s example by developing separate 
companies and promoting their own brands. The huge potential of the China market 
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(and possibly Indian market) and the low profit margins for ODM firms (around 1–2%) 
are dual motivators for this trend.
6.2 Implications for the PC Industry
In an industry such as PCs, manufacturing and even product development skills are 
no longer a source of competitive advantage (with the exception of Apple, which 
charges a premium price for its proprietary PCs, which have distinctive hardware 
designs), but instead can be purchased in a relatively open global market. Offshoring 
enables firms to access lower cost knowledge and production workers through their 
own subsidiaries and through outsourcing to specialists such as CMs and ODMs. 
The economic advantage of outsourcing is even greater when specialist firms are 
clustered geographically and serve multiple branded companies, thereby providing 
economies of scale and specialization that branded firms cannot achieve internally 
(Hagel & Singer 1999). However, once activities are outsourced offshore, firms 
need to be aware that they will be giving away current capabilities and need to 
develop other skills to compete and survive.
The skills that will create competitive advantage for branded technology companies 
still involve innovation and operations but these are defined differently when activi-
ties such as product development and manufacturing can be outsourced to specialists 
who take advantage of low cost global resources. Today, operational advantage is 
gained by careful planning and execution in concert with outside manufacturing and 
logistics partners, so that supply meets demand, quality is maintained and warranty 
costs minimized—all cost factors. The key activities are demand forecasting, product 
lifecycle management, and supply chain management.
Innovation-based advantage requires adopting an integrator role (Prencipe 
2003), in which the firm creates new products by integrating different mixes of 
internal and external technologies and capabilities. The skills required include mar-
ket intelligence, industrial design, product architecture definition, and technology 
integration. For newer product categories such as the Apple iPod and Microsoft 
xBox360, successful innovation involves integration of hardware, software and 
services into a smoothly functioning and attractive entertainment system.
In this environment, firms must develop different skill mixes at home and 
abroad, and recognize the fact that this can mean eliminating or relocating activities 
and jobs from the U.S. While more experienced knowledge workers with the “right 
skills” may get higher paying jobs in the U.S., the less fortunate are replaced by 
more cost-effective offshore workers. However, those firms who fail to make neces-
sary changes ultimately eliminate the most jobs, as well as destroy shareholder 
value. The biggest job losses in the PC industry have not come in successful com-
panies, but in the many companies that have disappeared altogether. The best way 
for executives in the PC industry to sustain employment (including their own) is to 
learn to succeed in the new global environment, taking advantage of the capabilities 
that exist beyond their borders while developing new capabilities inside.
5 Offshoring Trends 301
Appendix A – Form Factor and Offshore Sourcing
While both desktop and notebook PCs are based on the Wintel standard, there are 
important differences between these two form factors (Table 9) that affect sourcing.
Desktops are heavy and bulky and too expensive to ship by air so manufacturing 
is concentrated for scale economies while final assembly is regionalized for close-
ness to the market. The larger form factor makes two-step assembly easy, and enables 
using a few chassis upon which multiple models or SKUs can be designed for differ-
ent markets and with different configurations. On the design side, modularity means 
that developing a desktop product is primarily a problem of industrial design and 
system integration, i.e., deciding on the physical design of the product and incorpo-
rating new technologies into products and ensuring that they work together.
Most desktop models are based on industry standard form factors, such as the 
full-tower and mid-tower chassis, and there are standard motherboard layouts avail-
able from Intel and various third-party manufacturers that are designed for these 
chassis. While the design of a new chassis takes around 9 months, a new model 
based on an existing chassis can be built and tested in as little as 2 weeks. With a 
configure-to-order model, Dell and others might have thousands of potential hard-
ware and software permutations on a single platform. This complexity creates many 
opportunities for conflict s and incompatibilities, so testing all of these combina-
tions becomes a major part of the new product development process, which is why 
design activity is being pulled to development locations.
Notebook PCs have characteristics that create challenges in product development 
as they must be able to run on batteries, incorporate the display as part of the unit, 
they must be lightweight yet very sturdy, plus they are more visible so users care 
about style as well as function. Components must be packaged very tightly into a 
product that is small, thin, light, portable, durable and energy efficient, and which 
doesn’t become too hot to handle from the heat generated in its operation. 
Manufacturability is a major issue, as the product must be built in high volumes and 
at low cost, so final assembly must be a relatively simple process that allows packing 
components and subassemblies into a very tight space quickly and with a high level 
of reliability. As a result of these characteristics, notebooks have a longer and more 
expensive product development process. Even an upgrade of a model based on an 
Table 9 Desktop versus notebook form factor
Desktop Notebook
■
   Highly modular design.
■
   Development = system integration of new 
parts and software
■
   Mostly standardized parts, e.g., mother-
boards, drives, chips.
■
   Design for easy assembly, repair
■
   Shorter product cycles, more models
■
   Mature product
■
   Highly integrated design.
■
   Development = complex mechanical and 
electrical engineering challenges due to size, 
heat, ruggedness requirements
■
   Mix of standard and customized parts.
■
   Design for manufacturability critical
■
   Longer product cycles, fewer models
■
   Newer, still evolving product
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existing platform can take 3–6 months to develop, and a new chassis takes 12–15 
months. As with desktops, scale economies require concentration of production, but 
the small form factor of notebooks enables air shipment. On the other hand, the 
complexity of notebook development requires close proximity of design teams.
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